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A Note On Individual Recovery In
Derivative Suits
Richard A. Booth*
I. INTRODUCTION
A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder, in the name of a cor-
poration, to assert a right that belongs to the corporation.1 Accord-
ingly, if the suit is successful, the corporation will ordinarily recover.2
There have been, however, a few important cases in which the courts
have held that it is the individual shareholders who may recover.3
The leading case is Perlman v. Feldmann,4 in which the court held
that a controlling shareholder could not sell his controlling block of
stock at a premium over the market price, and thus ordered that he
share the premium pro rata with the rest of the shareholders. Perl-
man prompted an avalanche of commentary addressing the question
of whether control belongs to a controlling shareholder or is rather,
an asset of the corporation.5 The remedy of individual recovery,
* Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University, School of Law. J.D.,
Yale Law School; A.B., The University of Michigan.
1. See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 5953 (perm. ed. 1984).
2. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938); W. FLETCHER,
supra note 1, §§ 5953, 6028; Note, Individual Pro Rata Recovery in Stockholder's Deriv-
ative Suits, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (1956).
3. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 5953, 6028; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 904-06 (5th ed. 1980).
4. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). Professors Cary and Eisenberg, in their classic
casebook, cite Perlman as the first example of what they call "perhaps the most im-
portant category of pro rata cases . . . [namely] the residual category of cases where
such relief is the most effective technique for dealing with the parties' varying equi-
ties." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 905; see also W. FLETCHER, supra note
1, § 5953.
5. See Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Cor-
porate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956); Note, Liability for Sale of Controlling Stock: Perlman v.
Feldmann, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 786 (1955); Comment, Corporations-Stockholders-Fidu-
ciary Relationship in Sale of Controlling Stock Interest, 54 MICH. L. REV. 399 (1956);
Comment, Shareholders' Liability for Sale of Controlling Interest, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
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however, attracted little significant commentary, 6 despite the fact
that the remedy was clearly wrong as applied. Although the remedy
was concocted as a means of making the nonselling shareholders
whole, it is clear upon analysis that it did no such thing. Instead, it
allowed the controlling shareholder to realize a significantly higher
price for his shares than the nonselling shareholders could obtain,
even though the idea behind the remedy was that all shareholders
are entitled to equal treatment. Nevertheless, Pelman has since
been followed by other courts as precedent for pro rata recovery.7
The purpose of this article is first, to describe the rationale for in-
dividual recovery in sale of control cases and to demonstrate how this
rationale was incorrectly interpreted in Pelman v. Feldmann. As
will be demonstrated, the problem arises because the court incor-
rectly ordered that the premium be shared pro rata with the nonsell-
ing shareholders when it should have ordered-at least according to
its own logic-that the entire amount of the premium be disgorged
by the seller. Second, this article will show that the mistaken hold-
ing arose because the court failed to recognize that an out-of-pocket
measure of damages, rather than a benefit-of-the-bargain measure of
damages, was appropriate. Finally, this article will address whether a
benefit-of-the-bargain approach to damages is sensible in sale of con-
trol cases, and conclude that ordinarily it is not. In essence, the rem-
edy in Perlman v. Feldmann appears to have been incorrect, because
895 (1955); Recent Cases, Corporations-Liability of Stockholders-Controlling Stock-
holder Liable to Minority Stockholder for Profit from Sale of Stock, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1274 (1955). See also Andrews, Stockholders'Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Con-
trol, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965); Deutsch, Perlman v. Feldmann: A Case Study in
Contemporary Corporate Legal History, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1974); Javaras, Equal
Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Prof Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 420 (1965).
6. See Grenier, Prorata Recovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes of Action
as a Means of Achieving Corporate Justice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (1962); Note,
Liability of Controlling Stockholders for Profits from Sale of Stock, 25 FORDHAM L.
REV. 137 (1956); Note, Former Controlling Shareholders Liable for Prorata Share of
Difference Between Sale Price and Enterprise Value of Their Shares-Perlman v.
Feldman, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1559; Note, Shareholders' Derivative and Direct Actions-
Individual Recovery, 35 N.C.L. REV. 279 (1957); Note, Shareholders' Liability for Sale
of Controlling Interest, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 895 (1955); Note, Limitations on the Sale of
Controlling Shares, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 131; Note, Shareholders' Right to Direct Recovery
in Derivative Suits, 17 WYo. L.J. 208 (1963).
7. See Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977) (suit by share-
holder of merged company to recover for pre-merger wrong; citing Perlman); Atkin-
son v. Marquart, 112 Ariz. 304, 541 P.2d 556 (1975) (suit by shareholder of dissolved
close corporation); see also Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R.,
417 U.S. 703, 718 n.15 (1974) (suggesting pro rata recovery might be appropriate to
avoid recovery by wrongdoers); Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (1975) (awarding pro rata recovery in suit involving misappropriation of cor-
porate opportunity). But see Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246 (Del. 1970) (pro rata
recovery not recognized under Delaware law).
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it was either too liberal or too conservative. The implication is that
the small but important body of legal doctrine, relating to individual
recovery in similar derivative suits, must be seriously questioned.
II. THE REMEDY AND THE RATIONALE
While Perlman v. Feldmann is a case of almost mythic standing
and raises issues which defy resolution, the facts are quite simple.
Feldmann, as controlling shareholder (as well as chairman and presi-
dent) of Newport Steel Corporation, together with a few friends and
relatives, sold their 37% interest in Newport to a consortium of the
company's customers for $20 per share at a time when the stock was
trading in the open market at $12 per share. Thus, Feldmann sold
his shares at a premium of 67% over the market price. The Second
Circuit, in one of the few cases to so hold, ruled that Feldmann could
not keep this control premium because it represented a corporate
opportunity-to allocate scarce steel during wartime-that could not
be sold for individual profit at the expense of the remaining
shareholders.8
8. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 177-78. Perlman has been followed on this point in a few
cases, but certainly has never attained the status of a majority rule. See Jones v. H. F.
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108-12, 460 P.2d 464, 471-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599-602
(1969); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 261, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781, 786-87 (1969); see
also Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979); Comolli v.
Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278 (1978) (closely held corporation); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (closely held corporation). But
see Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.) (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Lazard
Freres & Co. v. Rosenfeld, 409 U.S. 802 (1971) (sale of control of investment adviser
firm held to be illegal sale of office).
Although the currently active market for corporate control makes the issues in Perl-
man seem quaint, the controversy over who owns control has never really been settled
as a matter of. law. See Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Hamilton, Private Sale of Control
Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. 248 (1985); Hazen, Transfers
of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law, Tender
Offers, Investment Companies-And A Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023
(1977); O'Neal, Sale of a Controlling Corporate Interest: Bases of Possible Seller Liabil-
ity, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 9 (1976); Ronen, Sale of Controlling Interest: A Financial Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Governing Law in the United States and Canada, 37 CASE W.
RES. 1 (1986); Schiff, Sale of Control: The Equal Opportunity and Foreseeable Harm
Theories Under Rule 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 507 (1977); see also Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974); Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
Indeed one commentator, whose theory it is that the sale of control is equivalent to
the sale of a corporate office, has made a virtual career out of the sale of control issue.
See D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY (1986); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CA-
1027
The action had been brought as a derivative suit in the name of the
corporation. 9 Ordinarily, it is the corporation that is entitled to re-
cover in a successful derivative suit.10 In Perlman, however, recovery
by the corporation would have represented a windfall to the purchas-
ers.1 ' For, as the opinion suggests, the premium may have been paid
by the buyer-customers in exchange for the opportunity to buy steel
at a lower price by cutting out some of Newport's profit. Moreover,
whatever the source of the premium, it represented part of the value
of the corporation and could not very well be handed back to the
buyers who, after bargaining at arms length, had agreed to pay it.
Reasoning that the corporation belonged proportionately to all the
shareholders, the court decided to divide the premium proportion-
ately between Feldmann and the remaining shareholders.12
As sensible as this result may seem, it is inconsistent with the
LIF. L; REV. 615 (1969); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 49
(1965); Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 583 (1965); Bayne,
Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee 53 GEO. L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne, The Non-Invest-
ment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L.J. 317 (1970); Bayne, The Investment Value of
Control Stock, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1265 (1970); Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Con-
trol, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445; Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg
Shoe-Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REV. 438 (1966); Bayne, A Philosophy of Cor-
porate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963);.Bayne, The S.E.C and the Sale of Control:
Ambivalence, Vacillation or Pusillanimity?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 49 (1988); see also
Levmore, A Primer on the Sales of Corporate Control (Book Review), 65 TEX. L. REV.
1061 (1987) (reviewing D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY (1986)).
9. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 174-75. It is not entirely clear why the suit was brought
derivatively, but it may have been because the corporate opportunity theory appeared
more promising than the idea that the shareholders had a personal interest in the op-
portunity to sell their stock. Curiously enough, disgruntled shareholders have, in the
meantime, succeeded in lawsuits based on the latter theory. See Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975) (closely held corporation); Jones
v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969). The issue
of whether a shareholder suit in the context of control transaction should be regarded
as derivative or direct can be quite difficult to resolve. For example, suppose a target
company issues a large block of stock at an attractively low price to a friendly party
who agrees to vote with management. A shareholder might challenge such a sale on
the grounds that the company received too little for its stock (essentially a derivative
mismanagement claim), or on the grounds that the sale thwarted the putative takeover
bid or reduced the offered price below what would otherwise have been offered. Such
issues appear to arise with increasing frequency. See Note, Distinguishing Individual
and Derivative Claims in the Context of Battles for Corporate Control: Lipton v. News
International, PLC 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 579 (1988). It thus seems quite possible that
the issue of individual recovery in derivative suits could arise again in the near future
in connection with a sale of controlling shares to a bidder at a premium in excess of
that offered to other shareholders. See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes,
86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988) (discussing possibility that larger shareholders of target
companies may be favored with opportunity to sell early and at attractive prices);
Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679 (1979); Tobin & Maiwurm, Beachhead Acquisi-
tions: Creating Waves in the Market Place, 38 Bus. LAW. 419 (1983).
10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
11. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 178.
12. Id.
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court's reasoning. Simply put, if the premium to Feldmann was a
payment for the right to loot the company after control passed (as
the court, in effect, held by characterizing the premium as having
come at the expense of the remaining shareholders), then the plain-
tiffs should have been awarded the entire amount. A simplification
of the facts is helpful to understand this inconsistency.
Assume that Newport Steel has 100 shares outstanding. Feldmann
owns 37 shares and sells them at $20 per share at a time when the
market price is $12 per share. The premium may come from two po-
lar sources. The buyer may really think the company is worth $20
per share or the buyer may really think the company is worth $12
per share and have in mind to recoup the premium by selling steel to
itself at a smaller mark-up, that is, by later looting the target com-
pany. Of course, the price the buyer truly believes to be correct may
also be somewhere between $12 and $20, but if it is less than $20,
some of Feldmann's premium would seem to arise from the opportu-
nity to loot the company.
To complete the calculation, if $12 is the "correct" price, Newport
is worth $1200. However, if $20 is the correct price, Newport is
worth $2000. The effect of the sale on the remaining shareholders at
these extremes can then be calculated as follows:
$12 per share $20 per share
Aggregate Value of
Company (100 shares); $ 1200 $ 2000
Less Feldmann Share
(37 shares at $20): 740 740
Remaining Value
For 63% Outsiders: $ 460 $ 1260
Value Per Share 460/63 1260/63
= $ 7.30 = $ 20.00
Outsiders' Loss
Per Share: $12.00 - 7.30 $20.00 - 20.00
= $ 4.70 = $ 0.00
In other words, if the shares had truly been worth only $12 each,
Feldmann's premium would have been nothing more than a bribe
and would have diluted the value remaining for the outsiders dollar
1029
for dollar.13 That is, if $12 is the correct price, it appears that Feld-
mann has appropriated $4.70 per share of the outsiders' value to him-
self. If the correct price is $20 on the other hand, Feldmann has
appropriated none of the outsiders' wealth. Finally, if the correct
price is somewhere between $12 and $20 per share, then Feldmann's
premium derives, in part, from both sources.
In Perlman, the Second Circuit ordered that the correct value of
the stock be determined and that any payment received by Feldmann
in excess of that amount be distributed proportionately among the
shareholders, that is, 63% to outsiders and 37% to Feldmann and his
friends. In the court's view, if the correct value of the stock is $20,
there is no award. However, if the correct value is $12, Feldmann has
received an excess of $8 per share or an aggregate excess premium of
$296. According to the court's order, outsiders should be awarded
63% of the $296. In other words, everyone, including Feldmann,
should get $2.96 per share. If, however, the shares were actually
worth $12, the outsiders would now have shares worth $6.67 (because
of Feldmann's misappropriation) plus $2.96 in cash coming back from
Feldmann for each share, or a total of $9.87 per share, even though
their original investment was worth $12. Feldmann, on the other
hand, would have $12 from the sale of the shares at fair value plus
$2.96 per share of the premium, for a total of $14.96 in cash. Clearly,
something is awry.
The problem is that, according to the logic of the decision, all of
the excess premium, if any, over the correct value, should have been
paid to the outside 63% shareholders. Indeed, this seems to follow al-
most obviously from the Second Circuit's holding that Feldmann's
premium came at the expense of the outside shareholders.14
The trial court, on remand, found that the correct value of the
shares was $14.67 and accordingly that Feldmann's excess premium
amounted to $5.33 per share.15 Assuming again that there are 100
shares outstanding, the aggregate excess premium for Feldmann's 37
shares would be $197.21. Thus, according to the Second Circuit's or-
der, all shareholders are entitled to $1.97 per share with Feldmann
receiving $14.67 plus $1.97 for a total of $16.64 per share. The situa-
tion can be depicted as in the previous table:
13. Indeed, the dilution of the outsiders' interest could have easily been greater
than dollar for dollar, as it is entirely possible that Feldmann sold control for less than
the buyer might have been willing to pay.
14. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 177-78.
15. Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436, 446 (D. Conn. 1957).
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$14.67 per share
Aggregate Value of
Company (100 shares): $1467
Less Feldmann Share
(37 shares at $20): 740
Remaining Value
For 63% Outsiders: $ 727
Value Per Share
For Outsiders: 727/63
- $11.54
Outsiders' Loss
Per Share: 14.67 - 11.54
- $ 3.13
Add Back Payment
From Feldmann: 1.97
Net Loss Per Share
After Award: $ 1.16
In other words, assuming the shares were worth $14.67, as the
court found, and assuming as before that Newport had 100 shares
outstanding, the company was actually worth $1467, of which Feld-
mann received $20 per share for his 37 shares or $740, leaving $727 in
value for the outsiders or $11.54 per share. Feldmann and the out-
siders both received $1.97 per share pursuant to the court's order,
leaving Feldmann with $16.64 per share and the remaining 63% of
the shareholders with $13.51 per share. Although it appears that eve-
ryone ends up better off (at least if one focuses on the fact that the
outside shareholders started out with shares that they could only sell
for $12), the latter distribution is far from as equal as the court be-
lieved it would be.16
The conventional wisdom is that the outside shareholders retained
their shares which were worth $14.67 and received cash of $1.97 per
16. One cannot help but suspect that on remand the trial court was cast in the role
of Solomon and, to a greater or lesser extent, massaged the numbers so that everyone
would come out with some gain. For the curious reader, the outside shareholders
would have broken even had the stock been valued at $14.96. That is, at $14.96 per
share, the portion of the premium disgorged by Feldmann would have fairly compen-
sated the outside shareholders for the supposed loss in value generated by Feldmann's
sale.
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share for a total value equal to that enjoyed by Feldmann.17 The
reason given by the Second Circuit, however, was that the premium
was at the expense of the outside shareholders. Moreover, quite apart
from this language, it seems clear that the court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs because it concluded that under the circumstances, the pre-
mium probably derived from the opportunity to loot Newport later.
At the very least, the court must have perceived a significant danger
of looting or it presumably would not have ordered any remedy at
all. That is, if the premium had arisen because of additional value
perceived by the buyers, there would have been no damage to the re-
maining shareholders. As the court concluded that there was damage
to the remaining shareholders, it must have reasoned that the pre-
mium arose because of the potential for looting.
III. RECONCILING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Several commentators have noticed the discrepancy between the
court's language and its actions.18 The usual explanation is that the
remedy was an effort to compensate the outside shareholders for the
opportunity appropriated by Feldmann, while allowing Feldmann to
keep a premium for control. It has been suggested that the order in
Perlman did not require Feldmann to disgorge the full premium but
only that portion of it attributable to the corporate opportunity to
sell steel during a period of shortage. While there may be some sense
in trying to distinguish a control premium from a bribe for a corpo-
rate opportunity, the Second Circuit's remedy does not rationally do
so. This is apparent from the fact that the more Newport was found
to be worth, the less Feldmann was required to disgorge. But clearly,
the potential for looting is wholly unrelated to the value of the com-
pany (except in the sense that the value of the company is the upper
limit of how much can be looted).
Alternatively, however, the court may have confused out-of-pocket
damages with benefit-of-the-bargain damages. The award may not
have been intended as compensation for the remaining shareholders,
but rather as disgorgement of unjust enrichment by Feldmann. This
explanation reconciles the apparent contradiction in allowing Feld-
mann to keep some of the premium for himself. Indeed, one would
expect that the more the company is worth, the less the premium
17. See Davis, supra note 8, at 79 n.270; Hazen, supra note 8, at 1030-41; Leech,
supra note 5, at 809-20; O'Neal, supra note 8, at 32-37.
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Second Circuit noted
that defendants could not well complain about the remedy, as recovery by the corpora-
tion would have entailed a larger payment--an observation which should have sug-
gested to the court that the chosen remedy allowed Feldmann to keep something
which he would not otherwise have been entitled to but for the form of the remedy.
Perlman, 219 F.2d at 178.
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constitutes unjust enrichment. If Perlman was an unjust enrichment
case, the unequal distribution is much less troubling since the party
that recovers for unjust enrichment need not have been damaged.
Redistribution is primarily a way of denying the gain to one party,
rather than a way of assuring that the other is made whole.19
A major problem with this explanation, however, is that it is incon-
sistent with the court's looting language.20 The Second Circuit seems
to state that unjust enrichment cannot be the explanation in denying
that the decision means a controlling shareholder can never sell con-
trol without finding a buyer for all of the shares.21 Indeed, too active
enforcement of notions of unjust enrichment may be counterproduc-
tive in the context of resolving the competing claims of shareholders
to a piece of the corporate pie.22 To understand why, it is necessary
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 comments b, g, illustration 7
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
20. Another serious problem with the holding that Feldmann had been unjustly
enriched is that it would have required a substantial departure from the norms of cor-
poration law which are not indicated in the opinion. Any such reading of Perlman
would seem to imply that Feldmann had a duty not only to manage Newport compe-
tently, but also to exploit every attractive opportunity that presented itself, perhaps
even irrespective of the line of business. Otherwise every sale of controlling shares at
a gain would indeed need to be of all the shares (contrary to what the court said) as it
would presumably be occasioned by the buyer's having identified some sort of profita-
ble opportunity that the seller in theory could also have discovered if only he or she
had been a better manager. Such a duty has sometimes been argued, but has seldom, if
ever prevailed in the absence of circumstances indicating that the company was for
sale. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (absent fraud or gross
overreaching, the court would not interfere with parent's declining to expand through
a subsidiary); Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (1962) (failing
to show fraud or mismanagement minority shareholder not entitled to wind up the
corporation); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (suggesting that corpo-
rate fiduciary may have duty not only to seek profit but to seek adequate profit given
risk and return characteristics of business), cert. denied sub nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983). But see Deutsch, supra note 5, at 2 (offering alternative argument
that decision was intended as random signal to corporate fiduciaries that mores had
deteriorated). Cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 8, at 298 (dismissing argument
that parent company in parent-subsidiary merger is entitled to larger share of gain if
parent happens to be in business of acquiring companies for profit); Hayes & Aberna-
thy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 68
(questioning whether financial strategies can be applied to operations); Note, The Con-
flict Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio
Approach, 88 YALE L. J. 1238 (1979).
21. Perlman, 219 F.2d at 178.
22. The courts have only recently begun to experiment with the use of a benefit-
of-the-bargain measure of damages in corporate control cases. The tendency in Dela-
ware is to use such a measure as a sort of penalty when there is a breach of fair deal-
ing between fiduciary and minority shareholder, but nevertheless to recognize that the
fiduciary is entitled to keep to itself its own opinions based on its proprietary knowl-
edge of the value of the minority interest in question and likewise to keep the gain in a
1033
to consider the reasons why buyers of whole companies are willing to
pay a premium over market price and why owners of control can le-
gitimately claim a right to this peculiar good.
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND THE SOURCES OF PREMIUMS
The ultimate question presented by Perlman v. Feldmann is why
was the buyer willing to pay a premium? Outright looting, or looting
consisting of the right to allocate to oneself scarce steel during war-
time price controls, seems to be a genuine possibility and appears to
be the explanation that the court found most likely. And it is hardly
exonerating that the premium was exacted from a third party after
arms length bargaining if the premium is in exchange for the right to
loot the company later. (Feldmann, after all, should not be allowed
to do indirectly what he cannot do directly.) While it might be ar-
gued that courts can deal with looting after a sale of control if and
when they find it, if later looting is the only believable way a buyer
can make back a premium, then it would seem better to recognize an
action against the seller while the seller still has the cash.23 In short,
the holding, though not the remedy, is at least defensible. There are,
fairly made bargain. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
712-14 (Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505 (Del. 1981). The
federal courts, on the other hand, have been extremely reluctant to award benefit of
the bargain damages in any but the most egregious cases of fraud involving clearly
gain-based inducements to trade. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981).
See generally Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984).
Similarly, most states interpret the statutory appraisal remedy for shareholders dis-
senting from mergers and other fundamental changes to allow only for an out-of-
pocket measure of compensation, that is, the value of the stock on the day before the
merger (or other transaction) and exclusive of any gain or loss from the transaction
itself. See Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987).
In other words, appraisal cannot compensate a dissenting shareholder for any gain that
should have been realized or shared even if it is clear that it would have been bar-
gained for in a fair negotiation. Delaware has admirably cast off this Neanderthal no-
tion. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-14.
23. In other words, the appropriate remedy would seem to be the imposition of a
constructive trust on the proceeds. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d
497 (Del. 1981); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Ore. 662, 683, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (1985); Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); see also Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 515 (1980). Even in cases in which the benefit is conveyed to a third party,
the courts will often impose a constructive trust if it is apparent that the benefit could
only have arisen as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty about which the third party
should have known. See Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1988) (recognizing
cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
greenmail payment); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 135, 214 Cal. Rptr.
177, 188 (1985) (constructive trust imposed on proceeds of greenmail payment found
likely to be in breach of fiduciary duty); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch.
1984) (recognition of possible cause of action for conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty);
see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1 (1985)
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however, other possible reasons why the buyer may have been will-
ing to pay a premium.
A. Misappropriation of Corporate Opportunity
First, the premium could have come from the buyer's willingness
to pay a higher price for steel. Due to wartime price controls, Feld-
mann could not charge higher prices (though the "Feldmann Plan"
he devised to obtain interest-free financing from customers amounted
to just that).24 That is, Feldmann could not pass on the benefit of
higher prices to shareholders in the normal way. Assuming Feld-
mann could show that he had not found a buyer for more than 37%
of the shares, it would seem that he could argue he was merely tak-
ing advantage of an indivisible benefit--one that by its nature could
not be shared-and had done no harm to the shareholders, though he
had clearly enriched himself.25 The intriguing aspect of this possibil-
ity is that it suggests that premiums may be appropriate in unusual
times, but inappropriate in ordinary times, which is exactly the oppo-
site of what the court in Perlman v. Feldmann said.26 Nevertheless,
(successful bidder for target paid most of settlement where it appeared hard bargain-
ing may have led to breach of fiduciary duty on part of target board).
The case for a constructive trust against a fiduciary himself, such as Feldmann,
should be even stronger. But, again, the remedy only fits if there is no other reason-
able explanation for the transaction in question. See Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1
Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, (1969) (use of holding company to facilitate
trading of interests in subsidiary denied access of remaining subsidiary shareholders to
market for no good reason and had potential for almost total separation of financial
claims from control). A per se rule, after all, would effectively prohibit a customer's
buying a controlling interest in a supplier (or vice versa). Presumably such transac-
tions are sometimes wealth enhancing. See Levmore, A Primer on the Sales of Corpo-
rate Control (Book Review), 65 TEx. L. REV. 1061 (1987) (reviewing D. BAYNE, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
(1986)). Thus, the courts have, at most, generally required only that there be a busi-
ness purpose for corporate control transactions. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969, 979 (Del. 1977) (procedural approach which eschews any review of motivations);
Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer business purpose test); Note, Approval of
Take-out Mergers by Minority Shareholders: From Substantive to Procedural Fairness,
93 YALE L. J. 1113 (1984). (It bears noting that Perlman can be seen as quite similar to
Cheff in that the court may have compensated for potential looting by the buyer in
Perlman, whereas the board of directors prevented looting by a potential buyer in
Cheff.).
24. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1955).
25. In fact, there had been negotiations between Newport and Follansbee Steel
Corp. regarding a possible merger, but Feldmann rejected the offer just days before he
sold his stock. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462 (2d Cir. 1952).
26. It might be argued that the Feldmann Plan amounted to a way of exacting
higher profits despite price controls and that the sale of Newport to its customers
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courts have generally taken a dim view of the argument that a corpo-
ration is not in a position to exploit an opportunity for the benefit of
all of its shareholders and have placed a high burden on managers
and controlling shareholders to prove that the opportunity in ques-
tion could not be shared.27
B. The Prospect of Superior Management by the Bidder
A second possible reason why the buyer may have been willing to
pay a premium is because the buyer thought it could manage the
company more efficiently. Alternatively, the buyer may have had se-
cret plans for the company or there may have been some unusual
synergy between the company and another company owned by the
buyer. In such a case, Feldmann would naturally bargain for part of
the gain even if he did not know why the buyer believed the com-
pany was valuable. Feldmann would reason that the buyer would not
be buying but for an expected gain, therefore, Feldmann would insist
on part of the gain.28 This possiblility, however, would seem to raise
the same question as the indivisible benefit scenario: Is there any
justification for denying some of the bonus to the other sharehold-
ers? If the premium comes from the third party buyer's innovative
ideas, why should Feldmann be allowed to keep a disproportionate
share of the gain? Such a bonus is pure windfall and in no way oper-
might result in their ending whatever Feldmann Plan contributions they had been
making. There are two responses. First, if the Feldmann Plan contributions were in-
deed a valuable substitute for conventionally measured profits they would have been
(or indeed were) reflected in the $12 price of the stock. Second, if the customers ne-
glected to continue the contributions, which had become something of an industry
standard, presumably they would be guilty of looting.
27. See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934)(defense of rejec-
tion of opportunity questioned since directors might have less incentive to seek financ-
ing or to take other steps to exploit if opportunity can be appropriated); Klinicki v.
Lundgren, 298 Ore. 662, 676-81, 695 P.2d 906 (1985) (argument that opportunity would
have been rejected or could not have been exploited will not be heard unless opportu-
nity has been offered); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1961).
This is much more in keeping, of course, with the traditional notions of fiduciary duty
which viewed conflict of interest as per se illegal (and immoral) rather than as a con-
flict of legitimate competing interests; see, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164
N.E. 545 (1928); N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 565 (1965); see also Levmore, A Primer on
the Sales of Corporate Control (Book Review), 65 TEX. L. REV. 1061 (1987) (reviewing
D. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FI-
DUCIARY DuTY) (1986)) (suggesting that decision in Perlman might have been
prompted by fact that Feldmann's sale at premium was a roundabout way of avoiding
price controls and thus prompted more by outrage at wartime venality). Cf. Getty Oil
Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887-88 (Del. 1970) (subsidiary's loss of oil import
quota because of acquistion of control by parent not compensable since parent gained
nothing by virtue of loss); Meyerson v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del.
Ch. 1967) (same, benefit of subsidiary's tax losses); Coffee, supra note 25, at 4 (sug-
gesting need to regulate shareholder pressure on management to appropriate wealth of
senior constituent groups).
28. See generally Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153 (1986).
1036
[Vol. 16: 1025, 1989] Individual Recovery In Derivative Suits
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ates to encourage Feldmann himself to innovate (except perhaps
in looking for buyers). The fact remains, however, that no one seems
to be harmed. The courts have generally held in this situation that it
is perfectly legitimate for the controlling shareholder to keep the
premium. The apparent reason is that it seems desirable to allow
sales of large partial interests in companies rather than to require
that all sales of control be accompanied by an offer to all the share-
holders to sell out.29 Any requirement that all shareholders be given
an equal opportunity to purchase shares would presumably eliminate
smaller buyers from the competition for control, as these smaller
buyers would find it difficult, or even impossible, to put together the
financing necessary to acquire of all the shares.30 Moreover, if the
sale is motivated by the bidder's better ideas, the nonselling share-
holders who are left behind will share in the gains as shareholders.
It thus seems clear that in a case involving a sale motivated by the
bidder's better management, the burden should be on the share-
holder who challenges the sale of control, and the judicial distinction
between such a case and an indivisible benefit case-where the bur-
den rests with the controlling shareholder-is well taken, for it per-
mits and even encourages transactions which increase overall wealth
while prohibiting transactions which merely rearrange wealth.
C. The Possibility of Differing Opinions as to Value
A third possible justification for the premium is that Feldmann be-
lieved his company was worth more than the market price indicated
or, at the very least, that it was worth more to him than to the other
shareholders. The question is thus whether Feldmann could legiti-
mately believe that the price he demanded and received was compen-
sation for what he gave up and not because he was in a position to
loot the company or sell the right to loot the company. The arguable
problem with this justification is that while it is possible that an
outsider may have a differing opinion about the value of a company
29. It bears noting that such is the rule in the United Kingdom. See DeMott, Cur-
rent Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
945 (1983). The idea has been rejected in the United States except in isolated judicial
decisions. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing
and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs-Advance Notice of Possible Commission
Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,637, at 86,914, 86,917-18 (June 21, 1984).
30. On the other hand, with the ready availability of junk bond financing, there
may be few remaining obstacles for smaller bidders. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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due to some secret plan, an insider is arguably duty-bound to use any
such idea for the good of all the shareholders. Feldmann's belief that
Newport was truly worth $20 per share, even if genuinely held, ought
to hold for the minority shares as well. If it does not, then either the
idea did not exist and Feldmann was getting a payment in considera-
tion of the buyer's later looting of the company or, Feldmann was in
effect receiving a bribe not to put his plan into action.3 '
This argument is based on the assumption that there is one best
estimate of the value of a company under incumbent management.
On the one hand this does not seem like an extreme assumption. Af-
ter all, the concept of the efficient market is now well established
(although it was not in 1955). It has thus been suggested by commen-
tators of widely differing philosophical leanings, that claims by man-
agers that the company is undervalued (and is therefore an
appropriate candidate to be taken private through a management
buyout) or that the company is actually worth more than some suitor
is offering (and therefore a tender offer must be resisted), are simply
incredible.32 Despite these protestations, however, management
buyouts, and tender offer defenses, remain prevalent. Their contin-
ued existence suggests that shareholders do not, on balance, find such
tactics objectionable3 3 and that there is something fallacious about
the assumption that there is one correct price for a company. Indeed,
it is the idea that a company cannot be worth more to a bidder (or
management for that matter), even in the absence of plans to loot it
later, that ultimately does not withstand analysis.
31. One might even go so far as to presume that a big bonus for control without a
concomitant rise in the price of publicly held stock signals an intent on the buyer's
part to later loot the company... or at least that remaining shareholders expect the
buyer later to loot the company. See generally Booth, The Emerging Conflict Between
Federal Securities Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73 (1986) (describing
dynamics by which shareholder opinions are reflected in market prices); Dennis, Mate-
riality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM &
MARY L. REV. 373 (1984) (same); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities
Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW 1 (1982) (same). On
the other hand, as is discussed more fully below, there are any number, of reasons why
market prices may not reflect values perceived by purchases of control.
32. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). It bears noting, though,
that some of the same commentators have also argued that any peculiar regulation of
sales of control at a premium will impede the transfer of corporate assets to their high-
est valuing owner and will thus be inefficient. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra,
with Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8. For an example of a recent and regretable
decision that the pre-bid market price is presumed to be fair compensation to a dissent-
ing shareholder if there was an active market for the target stock, see Armstrong v.
Marathon Oil Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 513 N.E.2d 776 (1987).
33. See generally Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807 (1987); Leebron, supra note 23, at 157.
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1. Downward Sloping Demand
Consider some simple facts about stock. For example, it is well
established that the more shares one seeks in a tender offer, the
more one must pay per share to obtain them.34 This observation, to-
gether with the fact that a company's repurchasing of its shares has a
tendency to raise or "stabilize" the market price35 and the fact that
large offerings of shares have a tendency to lower the market price,36
strongly suggest that shareholders have differing opinions as to the
worth of the shares. These rather simple facts answer both the Perl-
man court and those who would argue that any premium at all ought
to be enough to induce a shareholder to tender. In short, it is at least
believable that some shareholders value their shares more highly
than others and should be entitled to keep what appears to be an un-
usually high price from their sale. Moreover, such a belief has no un-
toward implications for one who subscribes to the efficient market
theory: An efficient equilibrium can be reached by the interaction of
traders at any level of shareholder demand and one would fully ex-
pect the equilibrium price to differ depending upon the supply. In
short, the assumption that any premium paid to the seller over the
true value must come out of the pockets of the remaining sharehold-
ers is dubious at best.3 7
34. See S.E.C. Office of the Chief Economist, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial
and Two-Tier Tender Offers (Apr. 19, 1985).
35. See Dann, Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders
and Stockholders, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (1981). But see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 14.4
(1986).
36. See Dann, Meyers, & Rabb, Trading Rules, Large Blocks, and the Speed of Ad-
justment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977); Kraus & Stoll, Price Impacts of Block Trading on
the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. FIN. 569 (1972); Scholes, The Market for Securities:
Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Inkformation on Share Prices, 45
J. Bus. 179 (1972).
37. The possibility and implications of downward sloping shareholder demand for
stock has been considered in several other works. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1719-20
(1985); Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. -
(1989); Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduci-
ary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633-38 (1985); Carney, Fundamental Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J.
69, 112-18; Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1178-83
(1984); Kanda & Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32
UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985); Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70
VA. L. REV. 645, 653-54 & n.29 (1984); see also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANACE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02(a)(1) comment, at 30-31
(Tent. Draft No. 5 1986) ("fairness is often a range rather than a point"); Chazen, Fair-
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2. Risk and Monitoring
Even if one is reluctant to embrace the notion that shareholders
may hold genuinely different opinions as to the value of the same
shares (though the idea is perfectly well accepted with respect to
every other sort of scarce good), there are other reasons to believe
that good faith disagreements as to value will arise and may ulti-
mately be reflected in discrepant prices being paid for various share-
holders' shares. In the first place, the owner of control is privileged,
within the broad limits of due care, to run the company as he sees
fit.38 This clearly creates some additional risk for noncontrolling
shareholders who may prefer policies other than those that manage-
ment ultimately chooses to pursue. The controlling shareholder
faces less risk because there is no chance that management will make
a disagreeable decision. Less risk means that, other things being
equal, the same investment is worth more.39 In short, a controlling
shareholder's shares are, by definition, worth more than a noncon-
trolling shareholder's shares. To put the matter starkly, some level
of looting (or what might better be called "quasi-looting") is to be ex-
pected and tolerated. No one would buy control of a company unless
control was worth something over and above the value of the shares
themselves as passive financial claims on the wealth of the company.
Yet, by definition, any such excess is denied to the remaining
shareholders.
To some extent, this reasoning applies to all large shareholders
who are in a position to affect the company's policies. The fewer
shares one owns, the less there is to be gained by keeping a close
watch on management behavior, as most of the benefits of monitor-
ing will be captured by others who own more shares. However, the
larger shareholder, who understands that monitoring efforts benefit
other shareholders as well, will rightfully seek to recapture part of
that benefit possibly by obtaining favored treatment from the com-
pany. Monitors, after all, deserve to be paid like any other provider
of services.40 Even if a monitor does not seek to be paid specially, the
ness from a Fincancial Point of View: Is "Third Party Sale Value" the Appropriate
Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
39. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 145-67 (3d
ed. 1988).
40. See generally Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corpo-
rate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982). It bears noting, however, that vote selling is uni-
versally condemned when it is not accompanied by a sale of the financial rights in the
corporation probably because differing distributions of votes and financial participation
are seen to create incentives to use control in ways other than to increase the value of
the firm as a whole. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 395, 410-11 (1983). On the other hand, allowing control to be sold without all
shares being sold can be viewed as inviting the same problem, but it is nevertheless
permitted not only in the sale of control context but in much subtler ways such as al-
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controlling shareholder will likely make a point of seeking to please
any shareholder who is in a position to monitor. Thus, to some ex-
tent, unequal division of corporate benefits is justified as a means of
keeping management more honest than it otherwise would be and
controlling blocks of stock, which carry such prerequisites, tend to
sell for more than smaller blocks.41
3. Diversification
Finally, the most important reason that shareholder opinions as
to value can differ is that some shareholders are more diversified
than others.42 While there is no excuse for a purely passive investor
to fail to diversify, such is not the case with controlling shareholders.
There are two fundamentally different reasons for investors to in-
vest. One is for passive financial return. The other is for financial
return in connection with active management. The former type of
shareholder, operating in an efficient market, is a rational price-taker
who wastes time and money trying to outguess the market. This is
so, not only because the market cannot consistently be beaten, but
because with a diversified portfolio of investments, selected on the
basis of offsetting risks rather than on predictions as to which compa-
nies will perform best, the investor can minimize overall risk. The
manager-investor, however, is vitally interested in the fortunes of
the subject company precisely because he or she is actively involved
in managing it. Moreover, the manager-investor cannot diversify in
crucial ways. Aside from the fact that one would need to be incredi-
bly wealthy to form a balanced diversified portfolio, much of a man-
ager's investment is in the form of human capital, that is, knowledge,
skills, contacts and other intangibles. These are of value only in con-
lowing dual class capitalization structures. See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1
Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (use of holding company to facilitate
trading of interests in subsidiary denied access of remaining subsidiary shareholders to
market for no good reason and had potential for almost total separation of financial
claims from control); Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. 776
(1979).
41. In addition to the now quite standard agency cost explanation for takeover
premiums, other explanations have recently been offered. See Black, Bidder Overpay-
ment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989); Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seri-
ously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988). It has also been suggested that tax savings from substitut-
ing debt for equity may account for takeover premiums. See, e.g., Lowenstein. Manage-
ment Boyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (1985). On reflection, this seems unlikely since it
would be just as easy (indeed easier) for incumbent management borrow and make a
large one-time distribution to shareholders.
42. See generally Coffee, supra note 30, at 4.
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nection with this or possibly a few other enterprises. In addition, the
manager may have agreed, precisely for the passive shareholders'
benefit, to forgo current compensation as a way of bonding perform-
ance. Thus, the manager will accumulate a still greater undiversified
investment in the form of deferred compensation. The inability of
managers to diversify suggests that their investments are, dollar for
dollar, less valuable than diversified investors' investments. This
may suggest that a controlling shareholder's receipt of a premium is
even more offensive than it might at first appear. On reflection,
however, this is clearly not the explantion, for no one would invest in
control if it were more profitable to diversify. It must be that con-
trolling shareholders tend to value their companies much more
highly than do passive investors as the value seen in the company
must compensate the controlling shareholder for the additional risk
taken by forgoing diversification.
Although one may be inclined to suspect that a sale of control at a
premium is likely to be motivated by the buyer's desire to loot the
company-especially when the buyer is a customer as in Perlman-
there are subtle but powerful reasons why shareholders can differ in
their opinion as to the value of the same company. This is so even
when one does not consider the traditional notions that directors, of-
ficers and controlling shareholders are trustees (of sorts) for the
shareholders, and should be required to account for any gain realized
in dealing with the company. Today, very large premiums are paid
for such control even when there is no real likelihood of looting.
Nevertheless, there are a significant number of deals, such as
management buyouts, in which conflicts of interest inhere. The fact
that shareholders have not generally pressed for the prohibition of
such deals strongly suggests that they represent a gain for both
parties.
V. THE REMEDY REVISITED
While in the end it seems most likely that the Second Circuit saw
Perlman v. Feldmann as a looting case, the single price fallacy
clearly infected the remedy regardless of theory behind it. The ap-
peals court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the
value of the company, presumably prior to the sale of control, in or-
der to determine the excess, if any, Feldmann had received. Yet, the
only way to determine whether Feldmann had received an excess
would have been to figure the company's worth under management
by the buyers after the sale. That, of course, is difficult to do, if for
no other reason than that buyers are often reluctant to discuss their
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plans for a company for fear of tipping off competitors.43 Neverthe-
less, it seems quite evident that a seller and a buyer must have differ-
ing opinions as to the value of anything they trade. Indeed, in the
absence of opportunity to loot, the only reason one sells anything is
that the buyer perceives it to be worth more than the selling price.44
It is entirely believable that Feldmann himself placed a higher value
on his stock than did most outside shareholders, simply because he
was privileged enough to control the company.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the remedy of pro rata re-
covery of the control premium makes no sense in Perlman v. Feld-
mann. If the case is a looting case, the entire premium over the
putative fair value of the stock should be paid to the outside share-
holders. If the case is not a looting case, there is no damage to the
outside shareholders while there are very good reasons-unanswered
by the the Second Circuit's opinion-why a controlling shareholder
might legitimately bargain for a premium in connection with a sale of
control.
It is of course possible that the premium came in part from both
sources. That is, Feldmann may have figured that his stock was
worth about $15 a share and may have been pleasantly surprised that
the buyers were willing to pay $20. In all fairness, the court may
have thought that it was doing rough justice by allowing Feldmann to
cash out at a fair price and requiring only that the excess premium
be shared. The problem with such a charitable view of the remedy is
that the outside shareholders are almost certainly over-compensated.
The premise, after all, is that their shares are worth more than the
43. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 32, at 1165 (arguing that defensive tac-
tics are economically inefficient because they discourage first bidders from making the
initial investment in searching for a target and putting together a deal some of which
costs can be avoided by subsequent bidders freeriding on the first bidder's discovery).
For an example of a case in which the potential purchaser insisted on a leg up, appar-
ently, in part, to act as compensation in the event his bid failed, see Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also supra note 28, and accompanying text.
On the other hand, there was evidence that Feldmann had declined an earlier offer
for Newport that would likely have allowed all the shareholders to sell. See Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462 (2d Cir. 1952). If indeed Newport was for sale
all along, it is not so clear that Perlman is a decision very far out of the mainstream of
current law. It is fairly well-settled at this point that once a company is for sale, the
board of directors has a strict duty to seek the highest price for all the shareholders
and to eschew personal benefits. See Hanson Trust, PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition,
Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to
Act as an Auctioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275 (1989).
44. See generally Leebron, supra note 28, at 159.
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market price indicated, but the remedy allows them both to keep
their shares and receive part of the payment for which Feldmann
bargained.
Ironically, then, it seems irrefutable that the remedy of pro rata
individual recovery in a sale of control case is either too little or too
much from the outside shareholders' point of view. There is no sce-
nario in which pro rata recovery appears to make any real sense, yet
individual recovery in a derivative suit is invariably pro rata. The
inescapable conclusion is that either the remedy is wrong or deriva-
tive suits are inappropriate in sale of control cases. Either way, the
entire body of law that has descended from the remedy devised in
Perlman v. Feldmann must be questioned.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the Second Circuit is to be taken at its word, Perlman v. Feld-
mann must be viewed as a looting or potential looting case. If it is a
looting case, and not an experiment with an expanded rule of equal
treatment for shareholders, the remedy of proportional individual re-
covery of the premium paid to Feldmann was clearly wrong. If it was
not a looting case, the remedy is even more clearly wrong as there
are any number of reasons why controlling shareholders might legiti-
mately seek a premium for their shares. It thus seems unlikely that
there is any situation in which pro rata individual recovery is appro-
priate in a sale of control case.
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